Support for MNs without requiring MNs being involved in the mobility Mobility management protocol that provides an IP mobility management Scenario 3: Proxy Mobile IPv6įigure 3: Mobile node's handover in PMIPv6 Internet-Draft Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND July 2009 4.3. Valid CGA and RSA signature option is to be treated as insecure by a Needs knowledge of the private key related to the MN'sĬryptographically Generated Address (CGA.) Any ICMPv6 NA without a Valid CGA option and the corresponding RSA Signature option, the HA It is not possible to apply the current SEND specification to protect Scenario 1: RFC 4389 Neighbor Discovery Proxyįigure 2: Proxy ND role of the Home agent in MIPv6 (i.e.: ND Proxy, MIPv6 Home Agent, PMIPv6 Mobile Access Gateway) canĤ.1. Which the ICMPv6 Neighbor Discovery signaling cannot be secured byĮither of the entities described in the following three scenarios, In this section we provide three different application scenarios for Internet-Draft Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND July 2009 4. Which the Secure Proxy ND is advertising. Without knowing the private key related to the source address ofĪn IPv6 address that doesn't belong to the Secure Proxy ND and for TerminologyĪ node authorized to either modify or generate a SEND message Internet-Draft Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND July 2009 3. From this point on we refer to such extension as "Secure This document extends the current SEND specification with support for Neighbor discovery signaling against specific threats.
Secure Neighbor Discovery specifies a method for securing Internet-Draft Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND July 2009 2. "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in thisĭocument are to be interpreted as described in. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", Internet-Draft Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND July 2009 1. Backward Compatibility with legacy SEND nodes. Scenario 1: RFC 4389 Neighbor Discovery Proxy. Support for Proxy ND, the Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND.ġ. This document extends the current SEND specification with Knowledge of the address owner's private key cannot be secured using The Proxy ND signaling initiated by nodes that do not possess To generate the digital signature on the message. The owner of the address and is in possession of the private key used Specified today, SEND assumes that the node advertising an address is Neighbor Discovery (ND) signaling against specific threats. Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) specifies a method for securing Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rightsĪnd restrictions with respect to this document. Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Internet-Draft Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND July 2009 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2010.Ĭopyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at Material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six monthsĪnd may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any Other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet. Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Translate it into languages other than English. Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to The person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, thisĭocument may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, andĭerivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards
ANYSEND KEY LICENSE
Without obtaining an adequate license from Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the The person(s) controlling theĬopyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF This document may contain materialįrom IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publiclyĪvailable before November 10, 2008.
ANYSEND KEY FULL
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-01
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